Liberal theory and application; in all its’ glory, structures and institutions at the macro-level in
A brief examination of the change in women’s representation in the Canadian House of Parliament from enfranchisement to the present will determine the truth of this claim of difference-blindness, and seek to explain possible reasons how this premise falls short in practice. Alternative electoral formulas may, on a comparatively pragmatic level, assist in remedying the short-fall of under-representation. Such alternatives will not remove the over-all effects of difference-blindness in macro-politics, but may lessen the effects. On the economic plane of liberal practice, it will be important to determine at the micro-level whether gains in macro-political representation affect the wage disparity between men and women. Liberal economic structures and liberal political theory both feign the notion of difference-blindness as the central guarantee of equality, and consequent basis of the form of government and form of economic structures and relations.
The claim against difference-blindness will first be evaluated from a philosophical point of view and then further substantiated from an empirical perspective. This paper focuses largely on the Canadian House of Parliament and women in
The analysis of the premise of difference-blindness is philosophically important because it follows Foucault’s critical work on the instrumental value of dominant discourses. He instructs us to examine power at the periphery and how it behaves in practice, against the theory which justifies and legitimizes this power. More specifically, he asks “what type of power is susceptible of producing discourses of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed with such potent effects.”[1] Analytically, ‘discourses of truth’ for the purposes of this essay takes this to signify that truth in which we consent to and live by in participating in the liberal system, wherein the potent effects is the translation of the possible into the pragmatic as truth.
Foucault also is aware that the liberal direction of power as juridico-discursively grounded does implicate liberal power as oppressive whenever it over-extends itself.[2] The determination of what constitutes an over-extension of liberal power is represented against its own theoretical framework, so it is again important to hold liberal theory accountable for its outcomes. He also is aware that “power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalizes, professionalises, and rewards its pursuit.”[3] This means that while difference-blindness may guarantee equality, the power of gender may be institutionalized, professionalized, and beneficial to those who suit the suit and follow its seams.
Liberal theory emerged from the ruins of a feudal and agrarian system. Charles Taylor argues that the shift from feudal to modern systems of collectivization brought to bare a shift in the politics of identity. He argues that the collapse of social hierarchies and honour ancien, coupled with an emerging liberal notion of dignity and egalitarianism produced a problem of the politics of equal recognition.[4] Whereas honour ancien identities were inherited through class and social status; and thus made for explicit relational identities, egalitarian dignity is not explicit but internally generated through interactions with others. In these aspects,
Yet this concept of an imagined wholeness, according to Connolly, is one of the most oppressive concepts for the self and its relations with others. Connolly reminds us that each individual in a society simultaneously maintains a particular combination of identities via an institutionally established fund of possibilities, contains difference that deviates from social norms, and embodies possibility which exceeds the pragmatic fund of identity.[6] Yet the premise of difference-blindness its consequential production of synthetic wholeness reduce individual possibilities to pragmatism. This reduction from the possible to the pragmatic on the basis of difference-blindness actualizes the status quo and prevents rapid change. These concepts may later be important in the analysis of difference-blindness as it affects the possibilities of women at the macro-level of Canadian politics, as well as the micro-level of economic structures.
Canadian pundit turned politician, Michael Ignatieff, has an interesting explication on the uses of difference blindness, which he calls ‘fictions of agreement and difference’. He admits that “behind those ‘self-evident’ liberal truths—that all human beings are equal, that their persons should be inviolable, and that they have enforceable rights by the simple fact of being human beings—lies a fiction.”[7] He elaborates further, suggesting in short that the fiction requires a screening-out of empirical realities in the name of moral convention (like in courtrooms and juries), and that “All liberal institutions depend for their continuance on this complex and historically novel thought experiment.”[8] Ignatieff understands the statement this process makes on issues of identity; that citizens are first juridical subjects who are formally committed to the notion that difference should not matter.[9] He admits that as far as outcomes are concerned, “our ‘minor’ differences do continue to confer advantage and disadvantage, and juridical and social equality remain far apart…and the institutions of our society depend for their legitimacy on this commitment.”[10] He lets the fact of the commitment to fiction represent the basis of legitimacy of a whole social system. This is because in his opinion, had liberal theory been intended to include all aspects of society, “the liberal fiction might never have been conceived.”[11] Ultimately, he suggests that the argument of liberalism as organized hypocrisy misses the point, since “without such imaginative hypocrisy, it might never have imagined a society of equal individuals at all.”[12] So the fiction of difference-blindness, he claims, permitted the instantiation of the notion of equality if only at the time for a specific group of people—but necessarily so—since he has argued may never have been conceived had it not had this fiction. In his defense of maintaining the fiction of difference-blindness, he suggests that while “the liberal ideal may be four hundred years old …it is only within the last fourty years since the civic emancipation of non-white peoples, that we have actually begun the experiment in earnest.”[13] Yet to suggest that the experiment begun in earnest with the emancipation of non-white peoples, and not women’s enfranchisement, is to be far too specific. Had he suggested that the experiment began when groups and identities other than European white propertied Christian males sought emancipation under the liberal premise of equality, his argument would be much more comprehensive. Yet from Ignatieff’s work it can be asserted that there is an instrumental value to believing in the concept of difference-blindness, since it acts as the groundwork to an egalitarian theory. Following Foucault, it is important to determine whether difference-blindness actually produces egalitarian outcomes, or just theoretically provides justification of domination on the basis of a synthetic equality that never could exist on the basis of difference-blindness. Ignatieff and the liberal theorists thus far have tended to prove the latter assertion.
Kymlicka examines the notion of difference-blindness as it relates to the challenge of minority rights within a liberal framework. He seeks to explain how this challenge relates to underlying principles of liberal democracy.[14] He is of a liberal culturalist position and concedes that some special rights must be afforded to reconcile the injustices that the premise of difference-blindness affects at the political and economic level. He acknowledges the problem of distinguishing between policies that restrict the individual, and policies that supplement individual rights for minority groups.[15] Yet his acknowledgement of supplemental individual rights is an acknowledgement of difference. Kymlicka justifies the departure from difference-blindness on the basis that the liberal democratic nation-state is not ethnoculturally neutral; that it is not difference-blind but a constitution of culture which is reproduced in and through its’ institutions.[16] That education is mandatory and taught in either French or English, that a dominant history of people’s is taught in schools, that the language of politics is predominantly English and French, that the language of the Canadian economy is, for the most part, English; is undeniably part of a culture and serves to reproduce that culture. He is making an important argument against the notion of difference-blindness on the basis that the state is not itself neutral. It cannot be difference-blind, because it contains characteristics of identity. Implicitly, a liberal democracy is maintained by an identity which has cloaked itself in the notion of difference-blindness; it is an identity no doubt, but does not recognize other identities or is highly reluctant to do so since its claim to legitimacy and equality hinges on difference-blindness. Kymlicka notes that mainstream institutions privilege the majority, its culture, and identity in so many ways, and while he discusses primarily the challenge of minority identities, his argument can easily be transposed in meaning on the experiences of Canadian women. After all, whose culture is privileged at the macro-political level? Whose culture is privileged at the micro-economic level? Whose culture is reproduced through mechanisms which are justified on the basis of equality; which is justified on the basis of neutrality?
It would be meaningful to return to Foucault’s instructions at this time to analyze the meaning of the difference between liberal theory and liberal practice. After assessing the philosophical, political, and instrumental value of the concept of difference-blindness in liberal theory, it would be most useful to explore how this notion affects women in practice. It is also at this point the claim against difference-blindness turns to an empirical substantiation.
It was in 1918 that the federal electoral level extended the franchise to all women aged 21 years and over, and the following year women became eligible for election to the House of Commons.[17] Yet in what was considered a difference-blind liberal institution, it took until 1921 for the first woman to be elected to the house, and there was only one.[18] The following table outlines the election year and marginal percentage of House representation of women:
1921 0.4% 1949 0% 1972 1.9% 1997 20.6%
1925 0.4% 1953 1.5% 1974 2.9% 2000 20.6%
1926 0.4% 1957 0.8% 1979 3.5% 2006 20.8%[19]
1930 0.4% 1962 1.9% 1980 5.0%
1935 0.8% 1963 1.5% 1984 9.6%
1940 0.4% 1965 1.5% 1988 13.2%
1945 0.4% 1968 0.4% 1993 18.0%
It is immediately obvious that since enfranchisement and gaining the right to run in federal electoral politics, women’s gains in representation in the Canadian House of Commons reflects a disconnect between the theory of difference-blind institutions, and actual outcomes of the practices of these institutions. According to the numbers above, more than half of the period since enfranchisement had the representational ratio dwindle at 0-1.9%, from 1921 until 1972. This utter lack of progress in the increase of women in parliament reflects a real problem in the liberal institution and its’ guarantees of difference-blindness. As discussed earlier, the premise of difference-blindness actualizes the status quo and inhibits change in the House of Commons. Theoretically, if the liberal democratic system was truly difference-blind, then upon enfranchisement women ought to have rapidly been elected to the House of Commons. This is not theoretical idealism; it is a matter of holding liberal theory accountable for its practices and outcomes. If liberal theory is legitimized on the basis of equality, and guarantees equality on the basis of difference-blindness, then it must produce outcomes which reflect this equality.
Studlar and Matland examine women’s representation in Canadian provincial legislatures from 1975 to 1994. They find that there has been a gradual increase in female candidates and legislators, and attribute these findings to a variety of causes.[20] The trend of under representation at the federal level is similar at the provincial level, with a few deviations on behalf of some provinces which Studlar and Matland attempt to explain. Their analysis of these trends seeks to explain why women still go underrepresented, and thus implicitly also hold liberal notions of equality and difference-blindness accountable. They posit that some of the reasons are specifically related to the electoral formula. It is important to note that at the federal and provincial level, actual representation of women in the juridical institutions is not equal, and upon enfranchisement has only seen a very slow growth rate, based on the expectation that equality actually produces equal outcomes.
MacIvor assesses a variety of factors which affect the outcomes of the election of female MP’s to the Canadian House of Parliament. She identifies the problem as rooted in formal and informal aspects of the electoral system; formal meaning legal and constitutional parameters, and informal meaning contextual, cultural, socio-economic, and political conditions.[21] Within a given structure, these factors create incentives for political actors and affect female participation. MacIvor suggests that while the “electoral systems do not by themselves determine the level of women’s parliamentary representation, disproportional systems impose formidable barriers to the nomination and election of female candidates.”[22]
MacIvor identifies district magnitude as one of the strongest predictors of women’s parliamentary representation, since the greater number of seats in a given district protracts a certain number of candidates which parties nominate, and thus determines the probability of a woman obtaining election.[26] She argues that in
1. Candidate-selection practices
2. Cultural attitudes towards gender equality
3. Socio-economic status of women[28]
The first contextual factor within the Canadian system is best demonstrated by the problem of the ‘local patronage’ model of candidate selection, which is a guarded tradition of local party control over selection.[29] Attitudes towards gender equality clearly reflect the matter of difference-blindness as an institution in society; whether it is taken seriously or not has an affect on female representational gains in the House. The third contextual factor is of interest because the liberal economic framework also feigns difference-blindness in the workplace. MacIvor argues that women are at a disadvantage socio-economically since they have less access to resources.[30] Yet this is also inconsistent with the liberal-economic schema of difference-blindness. Employers who first fought quotas on the basis that hiring practices were difference-blind gradually included quotas and measures to guarantee better chances for those who are different and thus recognized that those who were different were being excluded. This notion of micro-economic status and macro-political representation will be explored more in depth later.
As it stands, political quotas are still highly controversial. MacIvor identifies a cultural attitude against quotas on behalf of parties, and public opinion.[31] This is consistent with a societal acceptance of the notion of difference-blindness, and also shows how this view mediates against policies which would guarantee greater representation of women. It is in these aspects that difference-blindness can be understood to both guarantee equality and never be able to produce it. The Reform Party’s explicit stance against quotas and the non-recognition of the female identity was on the basis of difference-blindness. “Raney notes that Reform’s rejection of difference extended to the argument that social groups that claim to be different undermine the stability of the community. The party’s ideological commitment to a highly formalized notion of equality means that it would not endorse policies intended to address systemic, rather than direct, discrimination.”[32] Needless to say, the Reform Party’s election of female MPs to the House of Commons was unimpressive. The rejection of difference entails a rejection of measures which seek to improve the conditions of those who are different and less privileged than the dominant culture of society.
Micro-economic status and macro-political representation is an interesting convergence, since, as stated earlier both the economic and political feign difference-blindness and use this concept as the basis for legitimacy. Analysis of women’s micro-economic status will be limited to the gender-gap in pay for the purposes of meeting the required page limit of this essay. In 1999, “women were paid an average of 80 cents for every dollar earned by men. In other words, women earned an average of $17.14 per hour while men received $21.54 per hour.”[33] This implies that the labour market is also not difference-blind but has preferential esteem for male labour. A more extensive study on wage differentials by Pendakur and Pendakur suggests that earning differentials between whites and visible minorities reveals substantial earning differences between the white and visible minority groups, and particularly, at every earning cohort women were at a disadvantage relative to their male counterparts.[34] Suffice to say, the labour market is not difference-blind but prefers its dominant culture created and sustained by white males.
Fortin and Lemieux argue that the macro-political and micro-economic converge to further handicap women. They examine three institutional changes of the 1980s neo-conservative shift in the
This essay has sought to explain the political importance and instrumental value of the notion of difference-blindness and how this concept actively oppresses women at the macro-political level and micro-economic level. It follows Foucault’s instructions to examine the disconnection between theory and practice, and questions why there is a shortfall between the antecedent notion of difference-blind equality and its consequential outcomes which do not reflect the premise of equality. This essay holds liberal theory accountable for its diverging practices; it challenges the theories legitimacy and foundations by the outcomes it produces. On the pragmatic level it is important to recognize difference and attempt to provide justice for injustices that non-recognition have created. Difference-blindness actualizes the status quo and prevents rapid change. While on the pragmatic level it is difficult to reject the change-from-within paradigm, it is also a mode of activism which can only accomplish that which the dominant culture reluctantly permits.
It is important for us as human beings not to deny our humanity and creative potential. Pragmatism is usually a line followed because of the difficulties in overhauling an entire political and economic structure. Yet if we fail to rationalize the possible, our expectations will be limited to pragmatism, and our creativity will be stifled. Our very expectations of ourselves and each other will be limited to the status quo, and in the short-run this does not seem to be that bad of a compromise, it does not account for long-term human development.
But to be pragmatic, the following are policy recommendations which all Canadians should expect from their government:
1. That the concept of difference-blindness be abolished from the vocabulary of the law and institutions,
2. That a mixed-member plurality should be pursued and adopted to ensure better representation of women ,
3. That a difference-recognition institution should be set in place to mediate between the empowerment and overpowerment of those groups currently at the periphery of government
4. That equality is redefined as a starting point of legitimacy to include equal-but-different, beyond Charter interpretations
These are but a few immediate recommendations following a pragmatic viewpoint. Overall we must reconceive of ourselves and relations with others to promote a healthier and more just society.
[1] Foucault, Michel. “Two Lectures” Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977.
1980:Pantheon Books,
[2] Ibid, 88
[3] Ibid, 93.
[4] Taylor, Charles. “The Need for Recognition.” The Malaise of Modernity. 1991: Anansi, 43-53. 46
[5] Ibid. 48
[6] Connolly, William E. “An Ethos of Engagement.” Why I Am Not A Secularist. 2000:
[7] Ignatieff, Michael. “The Narcissism of Minor Difference.” The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. 1998: Penguin Group,
[8] Ibid, 64
[9] Ibid, 65
[10] Ibid, 65
[11] Ibid, 66
[12] Ibid, 67
[13] Ibid, 69
[14] Kymlicka, William. “The New Debate Over Minority Rights.” Politics In The Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. 2001:
[15] Ibid, 22
[16] Ibid, 24
[17] Elections,
[18] Ibid
[19] Heard, Andrew. “Women Candidates: Canadian Federal Elections, 1921-2006.” <http://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/elections/women-elected.html> visited Apr 2006
[20] Studlar, Donley T. and Richard E Matland. “The Dynamics of Women’s Representation in the Canadian Provinces, 1975-1994.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 29 (2) June 1996, 269-293.
[21] MacIvor, Heather. “Women and the Canadian Electoral System.” Women and Electoral Politics in
[22] Ibid, 23
[23] Ibid, 24
[24] Ibid, 24
[25] Ibid, 27
[26] Ibid, 28
[27] Ibid, 31
[28] Ibid, 29
[29] ibid, 29
[30] Ibid, 29
[31] Ibid, 34
[32] Young, Lisa. “Can Feminists Transform Party Politics? The Canadian Experience” Women and Electoral Politics in
[33]
[34] Pendakur,
[35] Fortin, Nicole M. and Thomas Lemieux. “Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: Is There a Linkage?” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11 (2) 1997, 75-96, 75
[36] Ibid, 95
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