Charles Taylor argues that the shift from feudal to modern systems of collectivization brought about a change in the politics of identity which made identity and matters of recognition inevitably important. He argues that the collapse of social hierarchies and ‘honour ancien’, and shift towards an emerging liberal notion of dignity and egalitarianism produced the problem of the politics of equal recognition.[1] Whereas honour ancien provided inherited identities through class and social status; thus making identity explicit and external in status, egalitarian dignity is not explicit but internally generated through interactions with others. This shift from external roles to inwardly generated roles meant that recognition is generated through dialogue and interaction with fellow modern civilians. Marx, Hooks, and Connolly provide interesting insight on ways in which identity politically participates in forms of domination and co-optation of personal interests for the sake of a larger whole. Each author disagrees not on the importance of identity for politics, but the extent to which identity should be the vector for politicizing interests.
Marx’s political theory is concerned with the relations between two groups throughout history; the proletariat, and the bourgeoisie. What is political for Marx is the tension between these two groups produced by their roles historically constituted to them via economic interaction. The proletariat and bourgeoisie; interlocked in a historical class struggle of exploitation, is what shapes political grievances.
According to Wood, Marx differed from many classical economic theorists in his refusal to create discontinuities between economic and political forces. Wood attempts to point out that Marx theorizes around social sets and relations of power which are integral to the circumstances of both the proletariat and bourgeoisie[2]. This is the groundwork for Marx’s arguments on the subject of the political; it is the interlocking relations between two historical groups of people and their interactions in the economic and political realms which are co-constitutive. It is in these aspects which Marx does not negate the role of identity in politics. He implicates group identities and roles as that which is most political, constituted through social and economic interaction, but highly political none the less. He suggests as a solution that the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish communism. How this solution is problematic will be discussed later.
Because identity is political, Marx argues that the group identities of the proletariat and bourgeoisie are paramount to the historical struggle they are engaged in. According to Marx, the bourgeoisie dominate and exploit the proletariat throughout history.[3] The personal interests of each bourgeoisie or proletariat are co-opted and foregone in the representation of the larger group whole; for the bourgeoisie, that nothing is more interesting or pressing than dominating the proletariat, and for the proletariat, that nothing is more interesting than overthrowing the bourgeoisie. This dualistic argumentation of the historical roles of two groups is not without its problems. Marx takes these two identities to be of greater significance than any other identity which these people may lay claim to. In these aspects Marx negates the power of alternative identities in favour of an aggregate group identity which becomes the greatest vector for politicizing interests. Because other identities are irrelevant to Marx, their power implicitly ought to be subordinated to the greater political interest of the class struggle.
Yet Marx’s treatment of the identities of the proletariat and bourgeois as constituted outside of history in ongoing interlocking relations presupposes that these groups do not change with history; Marx suggests that the conditions change but the relations stay the same. Mohanty would be curious about the instrumental value Marx acquires through the treatment of a diversity of peoples as reducible to one identity or the other.
Connolly would point out that in treating all identity as dualistic; there is instrumental value in conceiving of all identity as imagined wholes. According to Marx, these synthetic wholes are groups which, consumed by their singular identity and wholeness of group identity, make identity into the vector of politicizing interests. These groups, believing in their singular identity, make claims upon each other via their monolithic socio-economic identity. These groups are not difference-blind like liberal theory, but blind to differences of scale; much like liberal theory. Because Marx suggests that the proletariat and bourgeoisie make claims on each other, he implicitly adopts a rights-based direction of power. Furthermore, in his negation of other sources of identity, Marx negates other sources of claims and arenas of power for his subjects to access. It is in these aspects which Marx shows that he is not greatly different from liberal directions of power. A brief discussion of this direction of power is in order to better elaborate on this seemingly outrageous claim.
Immanuel Kant philosophized about the nature of claims, and consequential duties given on the basis of claims and rights. Doyle suggests that Kant’s work was instrumental in creating the liberal legacy of juridico-discursive power, as he states, “Appreciating these liberal legacies calls for another look at one of the greatest of liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.”[4] Doyle continues, arguing that liberalism is identified with the principle of freedom of the individual, and that “Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. This principle has generated rights and institutions.”[5] In short, the categorical imperative asks all ethical subjects to treat others as such, to will all acts to become universal, and never to treat other ethical subjects as objects or means to an end. All ethical subjects make claims on each other. It is in these aspects which Marx’s solution of communism becomes difficult in understanding as differing completely from liberalism. Marx’s communism is based on the notion that groups make claims on each other; just like the way liberal theory suggests individuals make claims upon each other, but this is no different in direction of power, sources of power, or grounding these claims in notions of reciprocity. It could be argued further that Marx follows Bentham’s utilitarian calculus, where Marx interpreted notions of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain for the greatest amount of people in the form of communism. Yet proving the extent to which Marx followed liberal directions of power is not central in understanding his solutions for the politics of identity. It merely stands as a bridge between proving that he followed a claim-based power system of groups, and that there is an instrumental value of this form of power for his solution to the politics of identity.
Marx developed analytic tools and systems which revolutionized the way moderns conceive of their power relations. This is one claim the author will not attempt to disprove. But Marx differed scarcely in his modes of obtaining consent through synthetic wholes, negating possible identities and sources of power in favour of an interested behaviour in the politics of identity, and ultimately sought to resolve the politics of identity by producing dominant identities. His solution to the problem of identity as a political tool is to make it disappear in a utopia of communism. He suggests that in taking away economic identities which differ greatly in strata, personal identities should feel liberated by the lack of difference. So Marx did not disagree that identity is important, but only certain identities counted in importance. This may be his greatest downfall, since it means his solution is only bound to this specific telling of the problem.
Hooks immediately juxtaposes Marx’s theories on the politics of identity in confronting the problem of equating that which one advocates with ones’ identity. She is apt in trying to avoid sustaining domination in identities, and the consequential co-opting of personal interests for a larger whole. Hooks, unlike Marx and even to a certain extent Connolly, takes more seriously the fact of identity being a vector for politicizing interests. Her similarities and differences between Connolly and Marx will be better elaborated later.
Hooks argues that the central problem in feminist discourse has been the inability to arrive at a consensus of feminism or accept definitions that serve as points of unification.[6] This disunity renders ‘feminism’ a floating signifier; a meaningless term.[7] Hooks points to the denigration of the term ‘feminist’ and how conflating identity with advocacy provides political ramifications which constrict feminist membership. Singular identities are problematic because it theoretically co-opts personal interests for the sake of a larger whole. Hooks suggests that there is a linguistic structure that gives primacy to certain groups in conflating advocacy with identity. Because of its own difficulty in definitional terms, the term ‘feminist’ itself is shunned from personal identities.[8]
Hooks assesses the previous feminist schools of thought and argues in nuanced ways how they fail to properly recognize identity as the vector for politicizing interests. She suggests that the fundamental philosophical problem of liberal feminism is the fact that an equality which seeks to mirror equality of men is a theoretical ideal that is not actually practiced. Hooks suggests this form of feminism instead seeks the equal capacity to dominate fellow men and women. According to Hooks, Liberal feminism is the feminism of the ruling class, but the gains of this school of feminism do not imply that this framework can eradicate systems of domination.[9] Identities which do not resemble liberal feminist identities are not represented in liberal feminist claims. Likewise, her analysis for a Marxist-feminist approach procures a similar inability to eradicate systems of domination since it is capable of co-opting piecemeal change.[10] To again juxtapose Hooks with Marx, it is interesting to note how her critique of conflating advocacy with identity in Marxian terms is based on the notion that creating synthetic wholes of identities and neglecting other political identities [both as legitimate and as sources of power] is what makes for piecemeal change in this approach. For Hooks, this approach fails to eradicate a form of domination of power within theory, since it co-opts personal interests for the sake of a larger whole.
Hook’s analysis for radical feminists differs particularly on the notion of identity in radical feminist theory. She is critical of incorporating identity into radical feminism. Transforming a political commitment into a lifestyle choice in Hooks’ opinion “reflects the class nature of the movement.”[11] She is especially critical of comfortable struggles in spaces which provide safety and support.[12] She argues that blurring the line between identity and advocacy plugs one “into preconceived notions of identity, role, or behavior.” It also gives one a false sense of engagement since one is only engaging with that which one is expected to be engaging in. In these aspects, Hooks essentially differs from Marx’s incorporation of advocacy into identity as a vector for politicizing interests. Domination is not subdued through subordinated identities, since singular identities can only politicize monolithic interests. That which is unrepresented as an identity is dominated and co-opted by larger interests.
Hooks instructs us to examine “the personal that is political, the politics of society as a whole, and global revolutionary politics.”[13] This instruction supposes that she proposes to solve the politics of identity through both advocacy, and inquiry. While trying to avoid generalizing all women under one umbrella of experiences, she suggests advocacy feminism focuses on diversity of women’s social and political experiences, thus centralizing “the experiences of all women.”[14] This type of feminism can represent a struggle to “eradicate the ideology of domination that permeates Western culture on various levels, as well as a commitment to reorganizing society so that the self-development of people can take precedence over imperialism, economic expansion, and material desires.”[15] It is an ethos of personal self-development against the ideology of domination which becomes the unifying but highly relative factor which, according to Hooks, is a better approach for the feminist struggle. It will not be the subjugation of one’s identity to other monolithic groups, but the engaging in multiple identities and advocating the relative experiences of each woman and her various experiences which transforms society. To consent to one’s personal struggle as anything less would be to accept the definition of the weak by the strong.[16] She notes, it is the very ethics of Western society which her position rejects in its resistance to deal with the individual and politics of identity in such terms.
Connolly’s work on identity and the individual is interesting because it also suggests that identity politically participates in forms of domination and co-optation of personal interests for the gains of a larger whole. The extent to which identity ought to be the vector for politicizing interests is a concern for Connolly, who also like Hooks suggests there are gains and loses in this style of politicizing interests.
Connolly argues that identity is political, and much political conflict is generated in the origins of identity. Connolly understands the politics of identity as reflective of two problems of evil; that notions of purity hegemonically protect identities, and that the constitution of an ‘other’ is the political tactic of self-reassurance.[17] He asks whether there is a practice of democracy, or strain of politics within democracy that can respond to the problematic relation between identity and difference.[18] He supposes there is, but refers to this concept more as a potentiality than actuality. He posits that there is an imaginary ‘agonistic democracy’ that “affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence of identity/difference.”[19] This definition of that which is conducive to a non-dominating and non-co-opting form of identity relations will be later explored in a treatment of Connolly’s ethos of engagement.
For now it may be important to note that Connolly views the question ‘why’ to be paramount in generating notions of responsibility. This is quite similar to Hook’s view on the difference between the articulation of woes of women and the development of feminist critical theory. For Hooks, describing one’s own woe stalls the progress of the feminist movement.[20] It is the question of ‘why’ that has simultaneously prevented advancement and begets advancement, so in response to this direction Hooks advises us to examine the personal which is political, politics of society as a whole, and global revolutionary politics. Connolly also recognizes that the question, ‘why’ is paramount in both constituting an identity and challenging an identity and its dogmas. He too, calls for an ethos of engagement to solve the paradoxical foundations of identity, and also warns against the celebration of any and every identity; much like Hooks’ rejection of woes as advancement to theory. Connolly suggests that “engaging the paradox of ethicality by cultivating the experience of contingency in identity does not entail the celebration of any and every identity.”[21] Both Hooks and Connolly therefore are for contingency of identity, but against the celebration and/or therapeutic self-aggrandising of any and every identity.
Connolly argues that dominant theoretical frameworks of collectivisation which actively participate in the individuals constitution of oneself instrumentally invokes imagined wholeness.[22] This wholeness “readily attaches itself to the nation whenever the state is established as the central agency of collective action and freedom.”[23] But the point at which wholeness becomes salient is in the way it can flow into a variety of containers, and beget violence.[24] Connolly thinks it is necessary to chasten the effects of imagining wholeness of communities, and thus spells out the philosophical reasons why wholeness is not a valid mode of politicizing interests. He points out that
Every individual simultaneously (a) crystallizes a particular…combination of identities made available by the institutionally established fund of possibilities, (b) contains differences that mark it as deviating from social norms in particular ways, and (c) embodies fugitive currents of energy and possibility exceeding the cultural fund of identities and differences through which it is organized.[25]
If these statements on the individual are true, then the concept of an imagined wholeness becomes problematic in three ways. First, because we are particularly crystallizing various identities from an established fund of possibilities, then no experiences will be alike. Without similar experiences, an imagined wholeness of identity is problematic and hegemonic since it co-opts alternative identities and their sources of power and legitimacy. Secondly, because we contain differences from norms in particular ways, the imagined wholeness of difference would be problematic because it too would co-opt the particular ways in which differences differ from the norms. Finally, because we can exceed the cultural fund of identity and differences, the proposition of instantiating an imagined whole can only be legitimate as far as the moment of its own instantiation. Because of the possibility of future differences which differ from current differences, making an imagined whole oppresses current variations and future possibilities for variations.
For Connolly, what is political is the ways in which individuals conceive of themselves and their relations with others. He argues that the way in which individuals conceive of societal wholes causes harm to the individual and others in society. For the individual identity, “some threats to that identity are manufactured by your own imagination of a wholeness that is unattainable.”[26] He is attempting to suggest that the acceptance of wholeness, valorizing it as that which one should aim for, and aiming for that which is impossible to acquire threatens the individual and its identity, placing one in a struggle which never brings satisfaction. For others, aiming for norms means that one’s own particular circumstances challenges a popular norm, such as the choice of homosexuality, or the right-to-die.[27] So the individual and society both inflict harm on themselves and each other in aiming for wholeness. It is in these aspects which Connolly can be understood to opposing identity as the vector for politicizing interests.
Connolly seeks to remedy the politics of identity with an ethos of engagement. This ethos is the process of self-artistry; it is the “selective desanctification of elements in your own identity.”[28] It is the fact of calling all assumptions about oneself into doubt so that “one part of your subjectivity… begins to work on other parts.”[29] Yet he also stipulates that one does not have complete control over the process.[30] This lack of control over this process is not unique, but merely an acknowledgement of the inability for one to objectively and subjectively know oneself. These recommendations are also consistent with his threefold critique of the notion of wholeness, wherein every individual, unique in their combination of identities, differences, and possibilities are free to experience the process of self-artistry, and not self-denial. Connolly suggests this enterprise is especially important because the notion of wholeness itself already circulates through individuals and collectivities.[31] The extent to which the effects of identity and wholeness is known can be attributed to what Connolly calls “lassiez-faire economists of political life” who “underplay the extent to which institutional practices not only regulate people but help to shape and constitute them.”[32] The dominant assumptions under a liberal democratic framework is that equality of individual identities is guaranteed by the notion of difference-blindness. It is this secularism which Connolly is highly critical of in its response to the politics of identity. While difference-blindness supposes no preferential esteem of any particular identity, in practice there is a dominant culture and identity, and this identity has a great effect on other identities.
A quick turn to the defences of liberal notions of difference-blindness may provide greater insight into what Connolly is attacking. Canadian pundit turned politician, Michael Ignatieff, has an interesting explication on the uses of difference blindness, which he calls ‘fictions of agreement and difference’. He admits that “behind those ‘self-evident’ liberal truths—that all human beings are equal, that their persons should be inviolable, and that they have enforceable rights by the simple fact of being human beings—lies a fiction.”[33] He elaborates further, suggesting in short that the fiction requires a screening-out of empirical realities in the name of moral convention (like in courtrooms and juries), and that “All liberal institutions depend for their continuance on this complex and historically novel thought experiment.”[34] Ignatieff understands the statement this process makes on issues of identity; that citizens are first juridical subjects who are formally committed to the notion that difference should not matter.[35] He admits that as far as outcomes are concerned, “our ‘minor’ differences do continue to confer advantage and disadvantage, and juridical and social equality remain far apart…and the institutions of our society depend for their legitimacy on this commitment.”[36] He lets the fact of the commitment to fiction represent the basis of legitimacy of a whole social system. Connolly would interject with the counter-argument that this fiction stifles human development, instantiates universality of identity and gives other identities something to aim for in particular, and cannot produce the equality that is theoretically guaranteed in the politics of identity.
Connolly also does not necessarily negate identity as the vector for politicizing interests, because he does demonstrate awareness of the productive tension “maintained between governance of a populace through established standards and the periodic interruption by social movements by modes of governance because of the suffering or exclusions they embody.”[37] The micro-process of self-artistry is advanced in encountering politicized interests of identities one may not be aware of nor know how to sympathise with yet.
Yet the cornerstone of Connolly’s argument rests on the notion that the de-construction project ought to be admitted as the norm of society, so that society would be able to escape the collective action problem of various groups attempting to establish universality and dominance over each other. He states, “Attachment across distance now becomes possible because neither party is hell-bent on achieving universality or wholeness by erasing the distance between it and the other.”[38] While this premise in his view reconciles the problem of identity and difference, and does not necessarily negate identity as a vector for politicizing interests, it does supplement one universal for another. “No single God, primordial contract, fixed conception of rationality, settled conception of self-interest, unified principle of justice, or practice of communicative consensus sits at the apex or base of an ethos of engagement.”[39] None except that base or apex itself and the denial of universality as an argument based on universality.
This point is important because it is highly instrumental in Connolly’s philosophy on identity and the ethos of engagement. His alternative of non-universality secures consent of groups not to vie for universality. This type of universality is conditional on the notion that when all groups consent not to aim for this value, this value replaces universality with universal relativism. This is hypothetically interesting and pragmatically problematic. Essentially, Connolly protects against the possibility of individual interests being co-opted by a dominant identity, while still permitting identity to act as the vector for politicizing interests. But the freedom of an individual to believe in achieving spirituality by advocating universality of his own religion is diminished by the relativistic ethos of engagement. Connolly is specifically making a statement against identities which take meaning from attempting to create universality in mankind of faith. In these ways, Connolly cannot escape the fact of domination in stipulating how one’s ethos ought to be.
Between the authors analyzed, it is clear that Hooks and Connolly find particular and important ways in which an ethos of engagement is a good answer to the question of identity and representing oneself. Marx’s political theory on identity commits the fallacy of universalizing identities while subordinating others for the sake of politicizing interests. While this is similar to Connolly’s failure on the question of those identities which exist with religious zeal, Connolly differs greatly in his treatment of identity. Perhaps what distinguishes Marx from Connolly best on this point is the emphasis Marx places on external political forces, and his failure to recognize internally generated forces of identity which do have legitimate power. Perhaps Marx wanted us to be utilitarian with our own interests, and forego the lesser identities for the greatest happiness of satisfying the needs of the dominant identities, you never know with a liberal in revolutionary clothing. Hooks and Connolly both recognize relativism of identity and how there are multiple active identities on one register, indicating these authors take seriously the political power and domination which can arise in the politics of identity.
Each author merits comparison to the notion
Now we shall focus the analysis at the pragmatic level to see how the various authors’ views on identity actually hold up on my register. Thus far this has been an interesting prolegomena to any future identity, and taking it a step further is both required and necessary to complete this paper.
As far as I know, I have multiple identities. So as it stands, Marx’s theory immediately means less to my register of myself. Yet he will analytically prove to be interesting later on a paragraph about how I conceive of my role in the great socio-economic scheme of things. But for now, I would say I am
Marx’s analysis for my role in society is vague. Am I a proletariat student, eating second-rate meals, exploited by the on campus monopolies of food services? How about the fact that there is a monopoly on campus of books and that I have to go further to access fair pricing to avoid being exploited by transnational corporations? What about the way tuition goes up every so often to account for inflation, but my wages stay the same and no bourgeois bureaucrat hearkens for my wages to rise with inflation? What about the increasing student debt problem? Yet this question begs another: what about the argument that I am a bourgeois student, exploiting my poor proletariat parents for money to afford higher education, so that I can get out and exploit those without political science and philosophy degrees to do my bidding? What about when I buy University of Ottawa brand clothing and exploit the youngsters over in developing countries which have poor human rights records? Or how about the bourgeois way this degree may secure a higher salary so I can continue to purchase goods made in places where the proletariats of the world suffer long hours and bad treatment so I can enjoy lifestyle? The point is clear; my identity and position is fluid and changes with the circumstances and particular choices I make. Marx can only point out the various ways in which I both exploit others and get exploited by others. I appreciate the tool, but cannot understand myself and my experiences in merely one role or another.
As a woman raised by a man, Hooks’ relativism is highly insightful and a source of strength. Not all women have the same experiences which make them women, but they are women no less. As a young girl growing up with her father [and British grandparents next door], it is clear to me now that I do not sympathise in experiences with women. I am awkward around them socially, I do not adopt their dominant up-speaking -‘like’ interjecting tongue, and am used to activity and boisterousness. Yet I am walking a fine line here; I am also used to seeing my father in a role not confined or divided against another. Father cooked, and cooked well, cleaned and kept the place tidy, taught his daughters how to do these things, he ironed shirts, did laundry, and generally ran a tight ship. This fine line is okay with Hooks though, she says that everybody’s experiences are contingent and identifying with a mass identity co-opts my own reality. Once I saw an ad that said ‘Let her experience the joy of not cooking tonight’ and it did not register with a mother figure, but my father figure. I did not have to deny that this was my reality; instead the reality being projected at me was the one to put in question. It is a sign of my own sympathies with Hooks’ theory in the way I refused to let the powerful define my experiences. And I ended up boycotting that company (Swiss Chalet) with my awesome feminine styled power. Yet let it be clear for Ms. Hooks; the elaboration of my experiences was not my idea of developing critical theory. I figured since we were asked to talk about political phenomena in an essay concerning the politics of identity, I would talk about the politics of my own subjectivities.
But Connolly? Surely Connolly has a role in my individual identity. Let it be highly representative to his work that I do not know what that role specifically is, but do not doubt that one subjectivity is working on another to figure it out. I am a skeptic in approach to the study of political philosophy, so his work strongly resides in my sense of inquiry and pursuit of philosophy. In student groups which I am active in, I try to recognize meaningfully where people are coming from and understand them to the point where it disturbs any dogmatization of myself I was permitting. I attempt to equally recognize identities and love that identity specifically for who they are and what they may be going through. The fact of engagement and a well developed ethos of engagement is the way in which Connolly plays my heart strings the most.
And whether you, reader-grader, think that these arguments constitute comparison between authors is up to your subjectivity. The personal is political. Why might your subjectivity think otherwise?
[1] Taylor, Charles. “The Need for Recognition.” The Malaise of Modernity. 1991: Anansi, 43-53. 46
[2] Wood, Ellen Meiksens. “Rethinking Base Superstructure.” Democracy Against Captitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism. 1995:
[3] Marx, Karl. “The Communist Manifesto.” The Marx-Engels Reader. 2nd ed. Edited by Robert C Tucker. 1978: W.W. Norton & Company, 473-501
[4] Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12 (3)
Summer 1983, 205-235, 206.
[5] Ibid, 206
[6] Hooks, Bell. “Feminism: A Movement to End Sexist Oppression.” Feminist Theory: From Margin to
Centre. 1984: South End Press,
[7] Ibid, 25
[8] Ibid, 24
[9] Ibid, 21-22
[10] Ibid, 23, quoting Gross 1977
[11] Ibid, 27
[12] Ibid, 30
[14] Ibid, 27
[15] Ibid, 26
[16] Hooks, Bell. “Changing Perspectives on Power” 92.
[17] Connolly, William. “Preface.” Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 1991:
[18] Ibid, x
[19] Ibid, x
[20] Hooks, 26
[21] Connolly, William. “The Problem of Evil”, 14
[22] Connolly, William. “An Ethos of Engagement”, 141
[23] Ibid, 141
[24] Ibid, 143
[25] Ibid, 143
[26] Ibid, 144
[27] Ibid, 140
[28] Ibid, 146
[29] Ibid, 146
[30] Ibid, 148
[31] Ibid, 150
[32] Ibid, 151
[33] Ignatieff, Michael. “The Narcissism of Minor Difference.” The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. 1998: Penguin Group,
[34] Ibid, 64
[35] Ibid, 65
[36] Ibid, 65
[37] Connolly, 154
[38] Ibid, 156
[39] Ibid, 154
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